Incentives to create jobs: Regional subsidies, national trade policy and foreign direct investment by Adams, Laurel et al.
1 
 
 
 
Incentives to Create Jobs:  Regional Subsidies, National Trade Policy and Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Laurel Adamsa,  Pierre Regibeaub, Katharine Rockettc 
 
December, 2013 
 
Abstract 
A national authority wishes to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to create local jobs.  We 
analyse the optimal national trade policy when local authorities might offer subsidies to convince a 
multi-national enterprise (MNE) to invest in their jurisdiction.  With centralised decision-making or 
with allocation of investment to particular localities, the central authority’s optimal policy is to use a 
high tariff to avoid payment of any subsidy to the MNE.  Despite this, some socially undesirable (but 
locally desirable) FDI cannot be avoided.  If local authorities compete to offer subsidies to attract 
local investment, then the central government’s optimal policy is to try to discourage FDI by 
choosing a low tariff.  Despite this, some socially undesirable – and even locally undesirable -- FDI 
prevails.  We conduct our analysis both assuming an upper bound on tariffs, as would be consistent 
with trade liberalisation, and allowing tariffs to vary freely.  The effect of increasing trade 
liberalisation depends heavily on the system of granting local subsidies: if the system is centralised, 
trade liberalisation decreases the range of parameters for which FDI occurs; if the system is 
decentralised and competitive, it increases this range. 
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1. Introduction 
Regional policy to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and generate new jobs has been prominent 
in the recent discussion of how to stimulate local economies and relieve the effects of the global 
recession1.  Jones and Wren (2008) note that, under European Union state aid rules, regional grants 
are one of the few means by which states can attract FDI.  Where serious underemployment exists, 
for example, economic incentives are permitted to attract foreign firms as a way of resolving 
underemployment problems.  Indeed, these authors comment that the UK and France devote half 
their regional policy budgets to financial incentives to attract FDI. 
Many countries have similar local stimulus policies aimed at attracting foreign investment.  A 
UNCTAD (2000) global survey notes that nearly all countries offered incentives targeted at specific 
sectors, while seventy per cent of countries offered regional incentives.  In many cases regional and 
sectoral incentives were integrated, so that only certain sectors received incentives in certain 
regions.  More generally, these incentives take a variety of forms and may be offered over time or as 
a lump sum to assist with entry.  Davies (2003) and OECD (2008) indicate that such incentives can 
affect FDI location decisions significantly2.  Offering more detail on this for the case of the UK, Ernst 
and Young (2011) finds that tax/subsidy benefits, supporting infrastructure investments, and low 
administrative requirements are all important factors in the decision of firms to locate in a region or 
not.  A major reason, also singled out in the report, for a state to offer these policies is employment 
gains, with 21,000 jobs created by FDI in the UK in 2010.   
As noted by the UNCTAD (2000) survey, in a federal system the package of incentives offered to the 
investor may include central as well as region-based incentives, while the process of agreeing a 
package may involve differing degrees of competition among regions.  Such competition can create 
windfall benefits for investors:  the report cites the case of Mercedes-Benz, which wished to 
establish a new car plant in the United States and contacted six states before deciding to accept a 
(generous) location package from Alabama.  Similar competition among states to attract a Ford 
Motors assembly plant occurred in Brazil.  The UNCTAD (2000) report goes on to enumerate an 
exhaustive list of regional policies towards FDI, illustrating that different countries have chosen 
different degrees of centralisation.  Roughly speaking, the US and Europe seem to take a relatively 
decentralised approach (although this varies by country), many developing countries seem to take 
the approach of designating a limited number of regions (sometimes only one) that are allowed to 
offer the incentives without internal competition among regions, and some smaller countries (such 
as Singapore) take a purely centralised approach, where FDI packages can only be obtained from the 
national government.  When a region is the designated destination, the actual negotiations for the 
incentive package can be delegated to the local authority3. Jones and Wren (2008) note that 
                                                          
1
 See Ernst and Young (2011) or material from Scottish Development International at http://www.sdi.co.uk/ as 
examples of this. 
2
 OECD(2008) finds in a review of studies on the effect of tax incentives that a one per cent increase in 
effective tax rates results in up to a five per cent decrease in FDI. Davies quotes similar findings for the 
responsiveness of FDI to changes in US state tax rates. 
3
 The degree of delegation to the local authority can be a matter of intense debate.  To give some examples, 
recent discussion about how to set up an Enterprise Zone comprising Northern Ireland has focussed on 
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centralisation and the degree to which competition is permitted among regions within a country can 
also vary over time, documenting the vacillations in the UK system4. 
FDI location decisions are affected by more than just regional incentive policies, however.   A recent 
OECD report stated that “Trade policy is one of the main determinants of foreign firms in their 
investment decisions…High barriers to imports can include tariff-jumping FDI – FDI as an alternative 
to trade.”5  Even in federalised countries, trade policy typically is in the hands of the central 
government.  For federal governments concerned that competition among regions can dissipate the 
rents that would otherwise accrue to the country from FDI, trade policy as a tool to avoid this 
destructive competition is one way forward.  Intuitively, trade policy can deal with the problem of 
excessive local bidding in two ways:  first, in setting high tariffs the central government can decrease 
the “bargaining power “of the multinational enterprise (MNE).  This policy does not discourage FDI, 
but it can decrease the rents captured by the firm in the bidding.  Another approach is to lower the 
tariff so as to make the (local) incentives required to attract the FDI prohibitively high for the 
region(s).  This policy potentially eliminates FDI entirely in favour of imports, but also eliminates 
costly subsidy competition in the process.  Where local subsidies would mount to levels that 
outweigh the country’s gains, this can be a better choice for the nation as a whole. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Enterprise Zones as a means of attracting FDI and on the degree of delegation of specific incentive 
negotiations to Northern Ireland as a local authority.  See 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmniaf/558/55808.htm and 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmniaf/558/558we15.htm. Belgium used to 
operate a centralised system, where typically enquiries went through diplomatic channels to the central 
government, which then decided whether this opportunity would be for the “Flemish” or the “Walloon” region 
of the country, at which stage negotiations with the regional, provincial, or communal authorities could 
proceed.  Interestingly, Belgium is now extremely decentralised, so that its two main regions would normally 
be trying to attract the same MNE’s.  China has followed a policy that has vacillated between more and less 
local control of approval of foreign investment projects, even within the limited number of economic zones in 
which FDI has been permitted in the past.  For some sectors, central approval is required whereas for others 
an “automatic” route allows entry with approval by a delegated board.  See 
http://www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=17&SubMenuId=11 for a description of 
current procedures.   The right to grant tax breaks to FDI has been centralised, so that different regions could 
be favoured.  For example, central and western areas have been given the right to allow tax incentives, while 
this right has been reduced for coastal areas.  See 
http://www.chinalawblog.com/2010/05/china_foreign_direct_investmen.html. India, too, has modified its 
policy over time from a system of industrial licensing, largely controlled by the centre and including location 
restrictions, to one of largely decentralised policies at the state level.  For discussion see Ahluwalia (2002).     
4 Following the abolition of regional development agencies by the coalition government, responsibility for the 
promotion of the UK as an inward investment location was transferred to the national level whereas it was 
devolved before.  See http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/economic-development/englands-regional-
development-agencies .  For further discussion of recent changes in the degree of centralisation of FDI 
incentives in the UK and current policy implementation from a user perspective, see also 
http://www.coast2capital.org.uk/articles/foreign-direct-investment.html . 
 
5
 For a general outline of the many interactions among both tariffs and non-tariff barriers and foreign direct 
investment, including case studies and emphasis on developing countries, see Gage and Miroudot (2005).  That 
paper outlines a host of interactions, including protectionist policies.  Our goal is not to explore the interaction 
of trade and FDI policy in all its facets.  Rather, we explore a part of the intuition in this type of work, making 
precise the interactions among the policies considered.   
4 
 
This paper explores this intuition.  We study whether and how trade policy can be used effectively 
with incentives when incentives can be decentralised by region and where regions may or may not 
be allowed to compete for the FDI.  Following Brander and Spencer (1987) and the sense of the 
literature we have quoted as motivation, we postulate that FDI can increase local levels of 
employment.  A single MNE considers investment into a country (or group of countries).  Local 
authorities try to attract the foreign firm by offering subsidies, which can be thought of broadly in 
our model as any package of incentives to attract the firm (involving tax breaks, infrastructure 
investments and so on).  Trade policy takes the form of a per unit import tariff set by the central 
government.  In choosing the tariff, the central authorities take into account its effect on the bidding 
behaviour of the local authorities and the investment decision of the MNE. 
Our first result is that, if both the trade and FDI attraction policies are centralised, FDI only occurs 
when it raises the country’s welfare.  FDI is induced optimally through a high tariff so that no 
subsidies are paid. This is consistent with the first of the two mechanisms outlined above: the tariff 
has the advantage of affecting the decision to locate but also the “bargaining position” of the firm, 
since it affects the attractiveness of the alternative of exporting.     
We next consider the fully decentralised case where different regions compete for FDI.  The crucial 
effect of this competition among regions is that the central government can no longer induce 
subsidy-free FDI by setting a high tariff.  To the contrary, by fully committing the firm to the FDI 
route, a high tariff can increase the level of subsidy offered by the states in their attempt to compete 
for the jobs that the foreign firm surely will create in one of the local jurisdictions.  In this case, then,  
the central government may find it optimal to avoid socially undesirable subsidized FDI by setting a 
low tariff, and so provide an incentive for the firm to switch to exports.  By improving the outside 
option of the firm, the central government makes FDI a more expensive proposition for the 
localities, potentially making FDI prohibitively expensive.   The central government curtails 
excessively expensive subsidy competition by lowering the tariff, which generates substitution into 
imports but reduces subsidy expense.   
Finally, we consider the case where FDI is assigned to a unique zone within the country, which is 
allowed to provide subsidies for FDI but which does not compete with other regions.  We find that in 
this case, the only difference with the fully centralised case may occur in the upper regions of costs, 
where the tariff may optimally be lowered to prevent subsidies’ being offered. 
Overall, when we compare regimes, we find that the range of levels of production efficiency for 
which FDI occurs under the optimal trade policies is larger with full centralisation or non-competitive 
bidding than with competitive bidding.  Competitive bidding makes FDI socially less desirable 
because FDI is associated with the payment of positive subsidies.  Since, for high cost levels, the 
government can effectively avoid undesirable FDI by setting a low tariff (so that the firm exports, by 
preference), the equilibrium range of FDI is curtailed.  Unsurprisingly, competitive bidding leads to 
higher levels of equilibrium subsidies.  On the other hand, tariffs with centralisation are at least as 
large as with competitive bidding:  a centralised system relies on high tariffs to reduce subsidy 
payments, whereas a decentralised system relies on low tariffs to achieve the same end.     
The recent debate about the benefits of a US-European free trade zone has brought into relief the 
continuing significance of even modest tariffs.  While some markets involve much higher tariffs than 
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one finds between the US and Europe6 , tariffs cannot be set in an unconstrained way under WTO 
rules.  It is important, then, in order to broaden the scope of the paper beyond our object of 
exploring the interaction of unconstrained trade policy and FDI policy, to derive the effect that tariff 
caps place on the optimal policies we have just outlined.  We therefore proceed to impose a 
maximum tariff level and examine the effect of progressively reducing these tariffs on FDI and 
incentive levels.  We find that the effect of trade liberalisation depends crucially on the institutional 
regime we consider.  In the fully centralised case, a tightening of tariff caps leads to higher subsidy 
levels for the FDI that occurs, as it reduces the effectiveness of tariffs as a tool to lower subsidy 
payments, but to less FDI overall since FDI becomes less attractive for the host country as it becomes 
more expensive in subsidies.  Hence, both the amount of FDI and the instrument balance to induce it 
change.  With competition among regions, however, moderate caps may affect neither subsidy 
levels nor equilibrium FDI patterns since the optimal policy involves lower tariffs in any case.  On the 
other hand, more drastic trade liberalisation increases the range for which FDI subsidies are 
observed and can increase the range over which FDI occurs. This suggests that local governance is a 
factor to consider when determining whether trade liberalisation is likely to impact on FDI decisions.  
While the extension is useful, it is also important to realise that when we refer to “high” tariffs, we 
simply mean tariffs that are high enough to make a firm choose FDI over exports.  Such “high” tariffs 
can therefore be quite small in absolute terms, in which case our main analysis without tariffs 
remains the most pertinent.         
We also briefly consider how our results might change when we allow for the use of per unit 
subsidies rather than lump sum subsidies.  Output related subsidies create two main additional 
effects. Firstly, higher subsidies lead to higher output and hence higher employment. This additional 
employment benefit is perfectly internalised by the authority that offers the subsidy, be it federal or 
local. As such, it does not affect the nature of our results. The second effect is that output related 
subsidies also lead to lower output prices, which benefits all consumers. Since local authorities only 
care about local consumers, this creates a tendency for subsidies to be lower with decentralised 
decision making than with centralised decision making. This mitigates the tendency for competing 
local authority to offer subsidies that are higher than would be optimal for the country as a whole. 
Finally, we argue that the main conclusions of our analysis would still hold in a world where there 
are several MNEs that can serve the home market through exports and FDI.  An interesting collateral 
result of this discussion is that, in the intermediate case where subsidy setting is decentralised but 
there is no competitive bidding between states, it is optimal to “steer” all firms that wish to invest in 
the same industry toward the same region.  This offers a possible explanation for the often observed 
regional concentration of industries that does not depend on the existence of any favourable local 
conditions (such as vertical linkages or factor costs) or any network effect.   
Trade policy, FDI, and tax competition have been treated extensively in the literature.  Trade policy 
and tax competition have been examined jointly by Horst (1971) and Janeba (1996) but the tax 
competition occurs between two different countries that also can set their own trade policies.  In 
                                                          
6
 For a recent discussion of the still significant trade effects of even the historically low levels of existing tariffs 
between the US and Europe, see The Economist (27
th
 April, 2013, p. 44).  For tariff levels generally and their 
variance between markets, see http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/tariff_profiles12_e.pdf for the 
WTO summary of country and good categories for 2012.     
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contrast, we focus on regional tax/subsidy competition within a single tariff-setting country.  
Decentralisation in the presence of tax competition among countries has been studied by Wilson 
and Janeba (2005), with the result that decentralisation can improve welfare by serving as a 
commitment that changes the strategic behaviour of the competing countries, but this paper does 
not interact tax with trade policy7. While Brander and Spencer (1987) consider trade and tax policies 
in a setting where FDI generates local employment, they do not introduce competition among local 
authorities.  Also, the timing of their policies differs from ours: while they assume that the decision 
to enter a market is made before tariffs and taxes are set, we assume the contrary in order to focus 
on the incentive effects on firm location of these policies8.   
Trade and FDI policies have been interacted in other papers9.  Blanchard, in a series of papers (2007, 
2010 and Blanchard and Matschke (2012)), explores this interaction both theoretically and 
empirically, although she does not investigate the role of federalism or employment objectives as we 
do10.  Blanchard and Matschke (2012) provide some empirical support for a relation between 
offshoring and preferential trade agreements.   Vézina (2010) argues empirically that unilateral tariff 
cutting in Asia, 1988-2006, was driven by FDI competition for intermediate goods, although she does 
not observe the same relation for consumer goods.  Pflüger and Südekum (2009) also provide 
empirical results on the relation between entry subsidies and trade openness, where entry barriers 
are measured as non-tariff barriers and openness is measured as export plus import share relative to 
GDP.  They find a U-shaped relation between trade openness and effective entry cost.  Our setting 
generates both a potentially positive and negative relation between tariff level (“openness”) and 
                                                          
7
 See also references in Wilson and Janeba for other papers on decentralisation of tax policy in the presence of 
international capital flows.  Public good provision is a key element of many of these papers, but is not the 
focus of our work.   
8
 A wide number of other issues relating to decentralisation have been discussed, many in the context of 
developing countries, including institutional weakness (Estache and Wren-Lewis (2009)), accountability and 
corruption issues (Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006)), and political economy matters (Besley and Coate (2003)).  
We abstract from these considerations here. 
9 Heterogeneity has been a main theme in the literature on FDI versus export choice and the observed pattern 
of trade.  Cole and Davies (2011) and Davies (2005) focus on the role of firm heterogeneity in a setting where 
firms can choose between FDI and export, showing that non-cooperative tariff setting can promote entry by 
relatively inefficient firms.   In our setting, in fact, inefficient firms are not necessarily bad for welfare, as the 
form of inefficiency is that the firm must hire more workers – which is good if hiring occurs locally.  Hence, our 
welfare specification is important to our view on the advantages of inefficiency.  Pursuing the theme of 
heterogeneous firms, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) find that tax competition among states need not 
necessarily lower national welfare, as lowering state taxes can reduce a negative price externality across 
states.  In our setting, a negative pricing externality occurs across regions as well.  Indeed, a region may work 
hard to attract a firm for the employment benefits it generates locally but does not take into account the 
negative effect an inefficient firm might have on prices charged for the good in other regions.  This potentially 
generates excessive entry; however, in our setting this excess entry is potentially dampened at the national 
level through tariff manipulation.     
10
 See Albornoz and Crocos (2007) and Blanchard (2007) for complementary literature reviews. Blanchard 
(2010) points out that international ownership affects governments’ motives in trade legislation, although 
focussing on expropriation of profits in her own work.  Blanchard (2007) notes that international capital 
mobility, through its downward effects on tariffs, can be thought of to “substitute” for WTO restrictions.  
Notably, we do not generate downward pressure on tariffs for all institutional settings: our results depend on 
the internal governance structure of the country.  Note that Barros and Cabral (2000) investigate employment 
effects and their interaction with subsidies in a linear demand model but do not consider the interaction with 
trade policy or the effect of federalism. 
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entry cost (“subsidy”), but the sign of the relation depends on local governance suggesting that 
internal governance should be controlled for in this kind of empirical study.   
The closest paper to ours is Raff (2004), who examines the interaction between a local tax 
instrument (profit taxes) and trade policy.  Raff’s paper considers the interaction between tax and 
trade policy, deriving conditions on when FDI occurs and when it is or is not welfare-improving.  
While the two papers are similar at this general level, they depart substantially on their focus, 
institutional framework, and instrument choice.  Raff examines the effect of customs unions and 
free trade areas on FDI, where his focus is on which system should be chosen in a first stage of his 
game among three countries.  This difference yields a different modelling strategy where the 
baseline case is that of three completely independent countries that may set profit taxes and trade 
policy independently.  Our fully centralised case is the polar opposite, then, of his point of departure, 
and at no point can the regions in our paper set an independent trade policy.   While Raff’s question 
concerns what sorts of “constraining” agreements the countries should enter into and their relative 
advantages, in our framework the institutional structure is fixed and we ask how local and national 
policies interact.  Hence, a main point of his paper is that a customs union can serve to coordinate 
local trade policy.  This is not a concern of ours.   In terms of instrument, states control a profit tax in 
Raff’s model, with the associated benefits from locally generated profits rising monotonically with 
lower costs of production; in our framework the local benefit is not profits but employment, which is 
related non-linearly to production costs.  This generates a contrasting benefits profile, where lower 
cost production is not necessarily more beneficial since it could mean lower local employment.  This 
tension between efficiency and desirability is not present in his framework.  Further, he assumes 
that an initial asymmetry between the production costs is possible in the two states whereas we 
consider – in the first instance of the text – either very intense competition between symmetric 
states or very light competition where FDI is assigned to a single state.  On top of this, our 
framework is that of bargaining rather than Nash equilibrium, so that the function of the tariff to 
affect the “bargaining position” of the foreign firm, which is an emphasis of our paper is not a 
concern of his.   
Despite these differences, the papers can be linked: the fully decentralised case in our paper  
generates effects that could be present in a symmetric version of Raff’s customs union case, even 
though his actual emphasis is on asymmetric structures.  Our decentralised case without bidding can 
be seen as generating effects that could be present in a highly asymmetric version of Raff’s customs 
union case, where one region is so high cost that it is irrelevant to the location of investment.  
Hence, while the structures of the two papers are different enough that full nesting would not be 
possible, the sense of this paper is to study cases that could be viewed as “limits” of the asymmetric 
structure adopted by Raff.  Raff’s and our paper should be viewed as complementary, then, in the 
sense that they investigate the interaction of trade and tax policy under different combinations of 
the governmental level at which policy instruments are set, and different sources of local benefits 
from FDI.    
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  The basic model is presented in section 2.  The 
baseline case where trade and FDI policies are centralised is solved in section 3.  Section 4 analyses 
the cases of full-fledged bidding between local authorities, and section 5 compares the centralised 
and decentralised regimes.   Section 6 analyses the case of decentralisation without bidding 
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competition.  Section 7 revisits these three cases in the presence of tariff constraints.  Section 8 
examines the case of structured subsidies, which can affect both the efficiency of the firm under FDI 
and can even amount to a negative lump sum paid upon investment.  Finally, section 9 discusses the 
robustness of our results and proposes directions for future research.   
2. Basic Model 
A single MNE can either produce a good y locally or it can export it from one of its foreign plants.  
Consistent with the motivating examples in the introduction, an important feature of the model is 
that there is unemployment in the host country.  Indeed, one of the main rationales for regional FDI 
incentives is precisely to provide jobs in areas with high unemployment.  Following Brander and 
Spencer (1987), we model this unemployment as arising from the fact that the local wage w is set 
above its market clearing level.  We can think of the MNE as producing y using aL units of labour per 
unit of output so that L
i wac  is a constant marginal cost of production11.  This will allow us to link 
costs tightly to labour use, below, but also will allow us to write the profits of the MNE when it 
produces locally in the straightforward form:12 
 
ycyp ii ])([                                                                                                                                       (1) 
where p(y) is inverse demand and ci is the constant marginal cost of production.  The MNE’s chosen 
level of output and profits in the host country can be written )(),( ii ccy  , respectively.   
 
If the MNE does not invest in the local economy, all production takes place abroad and instead the 
host country is supplied by exports, earning: 
ycyp xx ])([                                                                                                                                      (2)  
where cx is the constant marginal cost of production abroad.  The MNE’s chosen level of output and 
profits in this case are )(),( xx ccy  .   
Reviewing the stages of our model in reverse order, given its location decisions the MNE sets output 
and reaps its payoff in the final – third -- stage of our model.  Anticipating the future profits it will 
earn, the MNE chooses in a second stage its location depending on where profits will be higher, 
selecting to invest in the host country if the profit from investing exceeds that of exporting. 
The host government wishes to maximise its country’s welfare given this potential location decision 
and has at its disposal two policy instruments that it can set prior to the MNE’s location: a per unit 
tariff, t, and a lump sum investment subsidy, S.   In the centralised benchmark case, both the tariff 
and subsidy are set at the federal level whereas in our decentralised analysis, subsidies are offered 
                                                          
11
As in Brander and Spencer, unemployment is obtained by assuming a binding minimum wage. This breaks 
the link between marginal productivity of labour and MNE efficiency, so that only the employment effect 
remains.   
12
 This intuition, and thus many of the results in the paper, holds for more complex production functions as 
long as labour cannot be substituted for too easily.   
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by regions or states within the host country.  By allowing the government to set these in the initial 
stage of the model, we are able to focus on internal subsidy competition and its effect on welfare 
and FDI.  In order to compete for FDI, regional authorities must clearly be able to offer credible 
incentive packages to the MNE before investment actually takes place.  As we have documented in 
the introduction, incentive packages seem to be empirically significant in firm location decisions.  
Moreover, commitment mechanisms do indeed exist.  Firstly, the incentive packages can be written 
into a legally enforceable contract.  Secondly, states hoping to ensure a steady flow of job-creating 
foreign investment cannot afford to destroy their reputation by reneging on previous deals.  When 
the federal government controls both trade and subsidy policy, it clearly does not matter whether 
tariffs or subsidies are set first.  For the versions of the model where subsidies are offered by states 
whereas trade policy is set at the federal level, we assume that the federal government moves 
before the states and anticipates the effects of its trade policy on the policies of local authorities and 
on the investment behaviour of the MNE.  The main justification for this assumption is that local 
investment packages are individualised and, as such, are determined through more flexible 
institutional mechanisms than trade policy.   
To abstract from the structure of incentive packages, we assume that the host government (or its 
states) may pay a lump sum subsidy, S>0, to the MNE if it invests to produce good y in the local 
economy.  We think of this subsidy as representing the discounted values of tax breaks that can be 
credibly committed to or as the value of infrastructure investments that the public authority has 
agreed to undertake on behalf of the MNE13.  We will assume throughout that this subsidy cannot be 
negative and that it does not affect the marginal cost of production of the MNE14.  The host 
government also can set trade policy towards the MNE, which consists of setting a unit import 
tariff/subsidy of t15.  Tariff revenues are redistributed to all citizens as a lump-sum transfer.  
Similarly, any subsidy is financed through a lump-sum tax.  Hence, the profits of the MNE under the 
two policies are: 
ytcyp
Sycyp
xx
ii
])([
])([




                                                                                                                         (3) 
                                                          
13
 We do not consider the hold up problems of a failure to commit to public policy or the differential risks of 
hold up in centralised rather than decentralised system.  For a discussion, see Kessing et al (2007). 
14
 If S is related to taxes, then assuming that the “normal” tax regime is the same at home and abroad, a 
negative value would mean that the MNE faces a tax treatment that is worse than the one offered to an 
established (foreign or domestic) firm.  Such discrimination might be illegal under local law and would certainly 
be frowned upon by the WTO.  In fact, such behaviour would be banned under the OECD model tax treaty.  
The assumption that subsidies do not affect marginal cost is made to simplify the solution of the bidding game 
between local authorities.  While this is reasonable if S represents future tax breaks or other lump sum 
incentives, one might expect infrastructure investment or certain other policies to change the marginal cost of 
production of the firm. The consequences of relaxing these assumptions are discussed in section 8. 
15
 Throughout we use per unit tariffs, but using ad valorem tariffs would not change the flavour of the 
argument.  Since the roles of tariffs in our model are to affect the MNE’s tariff jumping decision and collect 
revenues, the analysis could in principle be conducted with either type of tariff without affecting the 
qualitative results.  Because per unit tariffs affect only per unit costs they allow us to obtain results under fairly 
weak assumptions on the demand side of the model.  If we used ad valorem tariffs, the precise shape of 
demand would matter, as the tariff would apply to the MNE’s revenues.     
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And a comparison of these two expressions determines the location decision of the MNE.  Notice 
that if no subsidy is paid, the MNE invests if it is more efficient producing locally than abroad, i.e. if
tcc xi  .   
We assume that the utility of a representative home consumer is separable in a numeraire good, 
which is supplied by M identical firms.  We follow the framework of Brander and Spencer (1987) 
where the labour employed in the numeraire sector is independent of the public policy conducted 
toward sector y16 so that we can effectively focus for the remainder of the analysis on sector y only.    
Focussing purely on sector y, then, national welfare will be measured by the corresponding value of 
the utility function, u(y), which can be written as the sum of consumer surplus and income from 
sector y17.  If the host country imposes a tariff, then tariff income also enters into the welfare 
function.  If it grants a subsidy, then this subsidy must be deducted from national welfare.  Let iW
represent the welfare when the MNE invests and xW represent welfare when the MNE exports. For 
S = 0, we have: 
∆𝑊 ≡ 𝑊𝑖 − 𝑊𝑥 = 𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑖) +  𝑐𝑖𝑦(𝑐𝑖) −  𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡) − 𝑡𝑦(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡) 
                                                             = )()( tctycycCS xii                                                             (4) 
This expression summarises the trade-off faced by the host government in setting policy towards the 
MNE.  If ix ctc  then FDI leads to lower domestic prices and hence to greater consumer surplus.  
This benefit of FDI is greater for lower values of 𝑐𝑖. We also must consider the effects on 
employment, however.  Using L
i wac  , we can see that the term )( ii cyc corresponds to the 
additional employment income created by FDI, i.e. it is a “rent” from creating employment.  Since 
output is decreasing as marginal cost increases, there is a trade-off between attracting a very 
efficient MNE that has large output (and so a large workforce) and the fact that an efficient MNE 
needs few workers per unit of output. Hence, the employment benefits of FDI are not necessarily 
monotonic in 𝑐𝑖: indeed, they must increase in 𝑐𝑖 for 𝑐𝑖 close to zero and must  decrease in 𝑐𝑖 for 𝑐𝑖 
close enough to the choke point where 𝑦𝑖(𝑐𝑖) = 0.  Intuitively, since labour is the sole cost of 
production employment creation tends to be smaller if local production is very inefficient (in other 
words, either 𝑎𝐿 or/and w is large) so that local production is low; alternatively if local production is 
so efficient that only few local workers need to be hired to serve the local market, the employment 
contribution also is low.  Mild restrictions on the shape of our functions will allow us to resolve this 
trade-off and make conclusions about the optimality of different levels of decentralisation of the tax 
cum subsidy system that we analyse.     
3. A Benchmark:  The Fully Centralised Case 
                                                          
16
 Local production requires a specific factor of production that is in fixed supply and fully employed at some 
per unit return along with labour input.  For a full derivation of the implications of this structure, see Brander 
and Spencer (1987).  Also see our working paper, Adams et al (2012), for more detail. 
17
 We again follow Brander and Spencer (1987), who develop the details of this argument.    
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Let us define t* as the optimum tariff/subsidy when FDI is not possible.  We will call t* the “optimum 
tariff” in the sense that it maximises national welfare under an import regime18: 
𝑡∗ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡) + 𝑡𝑦(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡))                                      (5) 
It is useful to first look at the optimal tariff policy, when the MNE can choose between export and 
FDI but there are no investment-related subsidies.  We will take the unit cost of foreign production 
xc  as given and consider different ranges for the value of local production, 𝑐𝑖.  To clarify the 
terminology, we say that FDI is “socially desirable” if it leads to greater country-wide welfare than 
exports under the optimal tariff t*.   
First, for 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡∗, welfare is higher under FDI than under the best possible trade outcome.  
When this expression holds, FDI results in the same output and domestic price for good y as the best 
possible trade policy so that consumer surplus is the same under the two policies.  FDI also 
generates employment benefits of )( ii cyc , however, which must be balanced against tariff 
revenues *)(* tcyt x  .  Since the outputs are the same, we must only compare ic to t*.  We know, 
however, that 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡∗  so that *tc i  must hold for .0xc  It is therefore optimal for the 
government to set 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡∗ to ensure that the MNE chooses to invest.  We can then conclude that FDI 
is socially desirable and occurs in equilibrium.  Tariffs are set above the traditional “optimal tariff” 
level to ensure that this desirable FDI is chosen rather than the alternative of exports. 
Figure 1 illustrates the argument.  The top panel, figure 1(i) shows the profile of MNE profits under 
FDI and under exports as FDI falls in efficiency.  When FDI is more efficient, profits are higher; where 
they are equally efficient, profits are the same and when FDI is sufficiently inefficient, profits and 
output fall to zero at icmax .   The equivalent profiles of consumer surplus are illustrated in figure 1(ii), 
where consumer surplus is higher for FDI when local production is more efficient, is equal to that of 
exports at equal efficiencies, and falls to zero when local production no longer pays at icmax .   The 
employment benefits are illustrated compared to tariff income in figure 1(iii).  As we argued, above, 
when FDI and exports are equally efficient, it must be the case that employment benefits exceed 
tariff income.  At the same time, we know that employment benefits are concave for non-convex 
demand with benefits equal to zero at 0ic  and again at ii cc max .   
So far, we have only argued for the optimal policy at .*tcc xi   In order to determine the 
optimal policy for other values of 𝑐𝑖 we need to make an assumption about the shape of the welfare 
function.  This will ensure that the intuition we have developed so far – that employment benefits 
are sufficient to create a middle range of production efficiency levels for which FDI is attractive -- 
carries over into a larger parameter range.  We make an assumption of quasi-concavity, which 
implies that the welfare function will intersect the horizontal axis at most twice.  In order to 
concentrate on the case where the left hand intersection is positive we make an additional 
                                                          
18
 Our “optimum” tariff is equivalent to the optimum tariff derived in Brander and Spencer (1984). 
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assumption that export costs are low enough.  This allows us to reduce the number of cases to be 
considered without significantly affecting the qualitative results of the paper19.   
 
Assumption 1:  𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑖) + 𝑐𝑖𝑦(𝑐𝑖) is strictly quasi-concave in 𝑐𝑖 for all 𝑐𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖  ], where 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖  is 
defined such that 𝑦(𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖 ) ≡ 0. 
Assumption 2:   𝑊𝑖 <  𝑊𝑥  𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑖 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 =  𝑡∗, 𝑖. 𝑒.   𝐶𝑆(0) − 𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡∗) −  𝑡∗𝑦(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡∗) < 0. 
One can easily check that these assumptions are satisfied for linear demands.20 
Lemma 1: If assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, then there exist two non-negative values, 𝑐𝐿
𝑖  and 𝑐𝐻
𝑖  
such that FDI is socially desirable if and only if 𝑐𝑖 ∈ [max(0, 𝑐𝐿
𝑖 ) , 𝑐𝐻
𝑖 ].   
Proof:  See Appendix 
 
Figure 1(iv) illustrates these two assumptions and lemma 1.   xi WW , are measured on the vertical 
axis, with the value of iW  at 0ic less than xW , as required by assumption 2.  We see non-
negative values iH
i
L cc ,  illustrated in this figure, as assumption 2 ensures that 
xc  is low enough that 
i
Lc is positive.  
xi WW   occurs only between these two values of ic , as derived in lemma 1.  For 
no subsidy given, the welfare attainable is illustrated with the dashed line on the figure.   
For low values of ],0[ iL
i cc  the MNE decides to invest because the tariff combined with 
production costs abroad makes exporting relatively unprofitable even though this is not the best 
decision for the host country.  In other words, the firm “jumps” the tariff to obtain the lower cost of 
production associated with FDI.  For intermediate levels of *],[ tccc xiL
i  the MNE also chooses 
to invest, but this produces higher welfare than export.  This is because the employment gains are 
much larger for this case.  For range ]*,[ iH
xi ctcc  FDI also is the better decision for the host 
country, but export is chosen instead as soon as the cost of exporting falls below the cost producing 
in the host country.  This causes a discrete fall in welfare at .*tcc xi   In higher ranges, 
],[ max
ii
H
i ccc  the MNE’s decision to export coincides with the better decision for the host country, 
since employment gains would be small in any case.  Indeed, above icmax local production would not 
occur.   
Hence, the MNE’s investment reduces welfare compared to export for very efficient local production 
and improves welfare for intermediate levels of efficiency.   While it may seem counter-intuitive that 
the MNE’s investment reduces welfare precisely when local production is very efficient, it is 
important to recall that the counterfactual for the host country is earning tariff revenue.  Without 
                                                          
19
 A version of the paper where both cases are considered is available from the authors. 
20
 If P = A-By, we have y(c
i
)=(A-c
i
)/2B  so that CS(c
i
)+c
i
y(c
i
)=c
i
(A-c
i
)/2B +(A-c
i
)
2
/8B. 
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significant local employment benefits, the loss of tariff revenue is not worthwhile for the host 
country.    
We now need to consider what the optimal policy will be for the centralised government given this 
MNE behaviour.  Notice that, as the tariff rises, the level of ic at which the MNE is indifferent 
between exporting and investing rises, as is shown in figure 2(i).  For example, at the higher level of 
tariff in this figure, the MNE invests when ic is to the left of point H and exports when host country 
costs fall to the right of this point.  Recall that for costs ]*,[ iH
xi ctcc  , the host country prefers 
FDI but the MNE chooses to export.  If the host country raises the tariff above t*, it can influence this 
choice by making exporting less attractive.  This allows a discrete jump in host country welfare.  For 
this range, then, it is best for the host country to set a tariff that induces the MNE to invest, 
xiis ccct )(  .  At  ],[ max
ii
H
i ccc  , of course, the host country should lower tariffs to their 
optimal level, t*, to induce exporting since this produces higher welfare.  Throughout this range, the 
host country can induce the MNE to invest without incurring any subsidy cost, so the subsidy can 
optimally remain zero.   
At lower levels of host country production cost, *tcc xi  , it will be optimal to set the tariff 
equal to the optimal tariff, t*.  For the range *],[ tccc xiL
i  , investment both occurs and yields 
higher welfare than exports.  Hence, the tariff must be at least equal to the level that leaves the 
MNE indifferent between investing and not, )( is ctt  .  The best tariff level given this is *t .   
Referring to figures 2(iii) and 2(iv), for ],0[ iL
i cc  , investment is socially undesirable.  With t = t*, 
the MNE would choose to invest since 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡∗.  The only way for the government to prevent 
investment is then to set a lower tariff, 𝑡 < 𝑡𝑠(𝑐𝑖) ≡ 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑥.  However, departing from the optimal 
tariff t* also lowers the attractiveness of the export regime.  Which of these two opposing effects 
dominates?  At t = )( is ct , we have 𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑖) = 𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑥 +  𝑡𝑠(𝑐𝑖)) ) and 𝑦(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡𝑠(𝑐𝑖)) =  𝑦(𝑐𝑖) so 
that welfare can only increase under the condition that  𝑐𝑖 > 𝑡𝑠(𝑐𝑖).  This must be true for all xc > 0 
from the definition of )( is ct .  We conclude that best enforceable trade regime (i.e. the best tariff 
that leads the MNE to choose to export, stt  ) is dominated by the investment regime.  Hence, for 
all 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝑐𝐿
𝑖 , investment occurs in equilibrium even though it is not socially desirable. 
This completes the argument for proposition 1, below:   
 
Proposition 1:  With a centralised government, any socially desirable FDI occurs.  Whenever FDI is 
inefficient but socially desirable, ]*,[ iH
xi ctcc  , it is induced by setting a high enough tariff, 
)( is ct .  High cost, ],[ max
ii
H
i ccc  , socially undesirable FDI does not occur.  However, low-cost, 
],0[ iL
i cc  ,  undesirable FDI does occur, as it will not be prevented through a low tariff. In 
particular, if FDI is very efficient, it occurs in equilibrium even though it is socially undesirable. 
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Proof:  The proof is the argument contained in text and figures that are discussed above the 
proposition and so is not repeated here. 
Reiterating our intuition, FDI brings the strongest employment benefits when it is “moderately” 
efficient.  This means that, from the pure employment perspective, very efficient or very inefficient 
FDI is not attractive for the host country.  Tariff revenues and consumer surplus have to be 
considered alongside employment benefits, however.   Very inefficient FDI compared to export 
lowers consumer surplus.  If FDI is inefficient enough, the employment benefits are so small and the 
negative consumer surplus effects are so large that tariffs are lowered so as to induce the firm to 
export.  As FDI becomes more efficient, the employment benefits grow and the consumer surplus 
effects become more muted so that FDI is induced via a large enough tariff that exports are 
effectively discouraged.  As FDI continues to become more and more efficient, however, the 
employment benefits begin to fall off again so that FDI eventually becomes socially undesirable 
compared to exports and their associated tariff revenues.  Unfortunately, the only way to prevent 
the firm from choosing FDI, given its efficiency, is to lower the tariff significantly and so constrain 
tariff revenues.  When FDI is efficient enough, the tariff would have to be lowered to such an extent  
that it is better for the country simply to accept FDI.          
We have so far constrained lump-sum subsidies to be zero.  For this fully centralised benchmark 
case, allowing positive subsidies does not modify the analysis at all:  whenever FDI is socially 
desirable, it is more efficiently induced through a high tariff than through a subsidy (as the tariff is 
associated with revenues rather than a cost).  Moreover, clearly positive subsidies cannot help 
prevent undesirable FDI.  Summarising this argument, we can state: 
Proposition 2:  If trade and FDI policies are centralised and the government is not tariff-constrained, 
positive subsidies never are observed. 
 
4.  Decentralisation with Tax Competition 
We now consider the case of decentralised FDI policy with all N states bidding to attract the MNE, 
each state holding 1/N consumers.  This case approximates the situation in a growing number of 
countries.  While the US has a long tradition of states’ independently promoting themselves in the 
international business world, the trend towards greater “regionalisation” has brought such 
independent bidding behaviour to countries like Spain, Belgium and India or groups of countries like 
the European Union as we have discussed, above. 
We consider an initial period where the central government sets trade policy and, given this policy, 
the N regions afterwards bid for the investment by the MNE.  We will solve for the perfect equilibria 
of this tariff-subsidy-FDI game.  First, we will determine the equilibria of the intra-state bidding 
game.  We will see that the type of equilibrium that emerges depends crucially on the relative 
ranking of the three types of “critical” subsidies.  The second step will be to analyse how this ranking 
is affected by changes in the relative values of ci, cx and t.  We will then be able to characterise the 
optimal trade policy of the federal government. 
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4.1 Equilibria of the bidding game 
First, notice that the bid of a region will depend on what happens when it cannot attract the MNE.   
If another region would otherwise attract the MNE, then the region gets no employment benefit but 
it gets its share of consumer surplus CS(ci)/N. This means that the net benefit of actually attracting 
the FDI locally is just equal to the employment benefits 𝑐𝑖𝑦(𝑐𝑖).    Hence, the region ‘s maximum bid 
would be: 
)( iis cycS                                                                                    (6) 
This is the maximum subsidy a region would be willing to pay to “steal” the MNE away from another 
region, given that the MNE will invest in some region.   
On the other hand, if the alternative is that the MNE would export, then the region should be willing 
to bid up to the value of the employment benefits minus the share of the lost tariff revenues that 
the region would have obtained plus any difference between regional consumer surplus under FDI 
and under export, i.e.  
N
tctytcCS
N
cCS
cycS
xxi
ii )()()()(max

                                                                      (7) 
It follows from assumption 2 that: 
maxSS
s                                                                                                                                                      (8) 
In other words, a region is willing to pay more to steal FDI away from another state than to attract 
and MNE away from exporting . The reason is that exporting carries a revenue benefit that is shared 
by the regions on top of the share received of consumer surplus, whereas investment in another 
state carries only a share of consumer surplus as a benefit.  Hence, the alternative to local FDI is 
better in the case of exporting.  This drives down the amount the region is willing to pay to “avoid” 
this alternative.  Finally, we define minS as the minimum subsidy required to induce FDI.  In other 
words,  
)()(min
ix ctcS                                                                                                                              (9) 
 
Assumption 3: maxS and 
sS are quasi-concave in ic for all ],0[ max
ii cc  21. 
 
Given these bids, we solve the simultaneous bidding game and for the MNE’s acceptance or 
rejection of the bids.  This involves deriving several critical cut-off values of 𝑐𝑖.  These are stated 
formally and proved in the appendix as Lemma 2.  We will derive them graphically in the text. 
                                                          
21
 Again, this assumption is satisfied for many demand functions, including linear functions as for demand P = 
A-By and marginal cost c
i
, where S
s
 = c
i
(A-c
i
)/2B and Smax = constant + c
i
(A-c
i
)/2B + (A-c
i
)
2
/8BN. 
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The bids can be ranked according to table 1. Since Ss > Smax , only rankings R1, R2 and R5 can arise.     
The outcome is illustrated in figure 3 for the special case where the government sets the optimal 
tariff (𝑡 = 𝑡∗).  Figure 3(i) illustrates the MNE’s investment decision, repeating figure 1(i).  Figure 3(ii) 
illustrates the bidding profiles, derived in lemma 2 and capturing rankings R1, R2 and R5.  Notice that 
for 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡∗  we have 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 0, and at 𝑐
𝑖 =  𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖  we have 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 =  𝜋(𝑐
𝑥 + 𝑡∗) from the 
definition of 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛and 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖 .   As derived in lemma 2(c) and 2(d), 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 increases through this range of 
𝑐𝑖.  The profile of 𝑆𝑠 lies above the profile of 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥, as we have noted in the text, and both have the 
same humped shape, as we noted in the derivation of figures 1 and 2.   Lemma 2 (in the appendix) 
derives and defines intersection points with the horizontal axis 𝑐𝐿𝐿
𝑖  and 𝑐𝐻𝐻
𝑖 .  Lemma 2 also derives 
the intersection points, 𝑐𝑀
𝑖  and 𝑐𝐸
𝑖  that follow from the shapes and levels of the curves.  With this 
graph in hand and working from left to right on the horizontal axis, we see that ranking R1 of the 
bids occurs for the range 𝑐𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑐𝑀
𝑖 ], ranking R2 holds for the range  𝑐𝑖 ∈]𝑐𝑀
𝑖 , 𝑐𝐸
𝑖 ], and ranking R5 
holds for range 𝑐𝑖 > 𝑐𝐸
𝑖 .   The equilibrium bids for each of these ranges is stated in table 1, illustrated 
graphically in figure 3(iii) and re-stated formally in Proposition 3: 
 
Proposition 3:  The equilibrium subsidies offered by the states and the FDI behaviour of the firm are 
as follows:  if the unit cost of local production is sufficiently low (in other words, )0 iM
i cc  each 
state bids sS and FDI occurs.  If the unit cost of local production is sufficiently high (in other words, 
)iE
i cc   FDI does not occur and no subsidy is paid in equilibrium.  For intermediate levels of the unit 
cost of local production (in other words, i
E
ii
M ccc  ), there are two equilibria, one involving a 
subsidy equal to sS and FDI, and the other leading to exports and, therefore, no subsidies. 
Proof:  See Appendix 
 
FDI occurs as the unique equilibrium outcome over the lower range of values of ic .  Since this range 
necessarily extends beyond *tcc xi  , one can conclude that FDI can (for t*>0) be observed 
even though it entails significantly higher costs of production than exports.  If FDI is somewhat less 
efficient, there are two equilibria, one involving FDI and the other involving exports.  For still higher 
values of ic , the unique equilibrium outcome is export.  Whenever FDI is an equilibrium outcome,  
the MNE receives a subsidy sS equal to the employment benefits it generates. 
 
4.2 Optimal Trade Policy 
 
In order to determine the optimal trade policy of the central government we must first establish 
whether equilibrium FDI and its accompanying subsidies are socially excessive or insufficient.  We 
first derive this algebraically and then return to our graphical presentation. 
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We define the social benefits from FDI, net of “competitive” subsidies , sS , as  
)()()( *** tcyttcCScCSSWW xxisN                                                               (10)             
Clearly, NW is decreasing in 
ic .  This is because the “competitive” subsidy, sS ,  completely 
dissipates the employment benefits of FDI so that ic only affects the equilibrium price and, thus, 
consumer surplus.  Hence, under our maintained assumption 2 that 𝐶𝑆(0) − 𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡∗) −
 𝑡∗𝑦(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡∗) < 0, NW  is always negative.  This means that subsidised FDI is always socially 
undesirable compared to exports.     
Interestingly, since the equilibrium subsidies compete away all employment benefits, all regions 
have the same equilibrium welfare regardless of whether or not they manage to attract the MNE.  
This means that the effect of FDI on local welfare is just 1/Nth the effect of FDI on national welfare.  
In this sense, local and national desires to attract FDI are perfectly aligned ex post.  On the other 
hand, ex ante competition for employment benefits leads the states into a bidding war that can lead 
to welfare-reducing (compared to exports) subsidised FDI.  We can then state the following 
proposition to summarise the argument in the text:  
 
Proposition 4:  Under assumptions 1 and 2, and for t=t*, there tends to be excessive FDI.  For low 
values of ic  (in other words, )iM
i cc  , subsidised FDI occurs in equilibrium although it is harmful 
both socially and locally compared to exports.  Very cost-inefficient FDI (in other words, )iM
i cc  is 
also socially and locally undesirable compared to exports, but it never occurs in equilibrium. 
Proof:  The proof is contained in the text above the proposition and so not repeated here. 
 
Figure 3(iv) illustrates the welfare when the government applies the tariff t* and the winning region 
pays the optimal bid to attract FDI over the range where this is an equilibrium, as shown in section 
4.1.  The graph illustrates the case where the equilibrium without investment is selected over the 
interval ],] iE
i
M cc , although this is not central to the graphical argument.  Indeed, for the rest of the 
analysis it will be convenient to only consider one of the two kinds of equilibria that arise over this 
interval.  We shall focus on the equilibria without FDI for a variety of reasons22. Proposition 4 
                                                          
22
 This assumption does not materially affect the results but simplifies the analysis considerably.  We choose to 
focus on the case of exports for many reasons. First, all regions are better off in the FDI export equilibrium so 
that one might believe that they will manage to coordinate on it despite concerns about whether this should 
be expected to occur generally (See Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, pp. 20-22 for example).  Second, the 
multiplicity of equilibria is an artefact of the complete simultaneity of bidding by all regions.  If one were to 
consider a sequential auction where the MNE asks each region in turn to make a bid before choosing the 
location – and where previous bids are known to all players – the equilibrium outcome would be that all 
regions bid below Smin so that the MNE would not invest.  Hence, the export equilibrium is more robust to 
small changes in the game. This looks more like the Mercedes-Benz example we cited in the introduction, in 
fact. We thank Michael Riordan for pointing this out.   
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restates the result of this graph that, compared to exports, the investment equilibrium generates 
lower welfare for the case of low ci.       
We can now determine the optimal trade policy of the central authority.  It is important to underline 
at the outset that inter-regional competition makes a strategy of raising the tariff so as to induce FDI 
without the expense of a subsidy completely ineffective.  With competition, even if the tariff is set so 
that FDI would occur in the absence of subsidies, the regions still compete to attract the firm and are 
willing to offer subsidies up to sS to win the bidding war.   
Indeed, for high levels of ic increasing the tariff could actually trigger undesirable FDI.  We show this 
argument graphically in figure 4.  First, notice that )( iis cycS  does not depend on the tariff.  On 
the other hand, both minS and maxS do.  Taking first the case of 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 , we note that a decrease in the 
tariff shifts the 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 profile downwards.  This moves the intersection point, 𝑐𝐸
𝑖  to the right along 𝑆𝑠.  
Now, since )()]()()([
1
max
iixxi cyctctytcCScCS
N
S  and 
)]()(max[arg* tctytcCSt xx  , an increase in t shifts maxS down if and only if t<t* -- since 
we would thereby increase t towards the maximum -- and up if and only if t>t* -- since we would 
thereby increase t away from the maximum.  If 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 shifts down, then point M shifts left whereas if 
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 shifts up we have the contrary case where M shifts right.  Hence, for  t>t* we have 0
dt
dc iM  
so that an increase in the tariff actually enlarges the range of values of ic for which undesirable 
subsidised FDI occurs.  In other words, thinking of the intersection points E and M as functions of the 
tariff, t, for a value of ic a little above )(tc
i
M , a higher tariff could actually change the equilibrium 
from one with no FDI to one where socially undesirable subsidised FDI occurs.  For t<t*, on the other 
hand, the effect of a tariff increase on iMc is a priori ambiguous since both the minS  and maxS curves 
shift down.  Still, it is possible to show that the net effect of an increase in t on 
i
Mc is positive on 
balance. 
Lemma 3:  t
dt
dc iM  0  
Proof:  See Appendix 
 
The question then is whether trade policy is of any use at all in avoiding some of the socially 
undesirable FDI or, at least, in reducing the excessive subsidies paid to the MNE. 
If *)(tcc iM
i  the optimal policy clearly is to set t=t* and allow the market to be served through 
imports.  This is because the optimal tariff can be charged, maximising the benefits from imports, no 
subsidy is paid, and the firm chooses to export under this scheme.  We now look at the case where 
*)(tcc iM
i  .  Over this range, setting t=t* would actually trigger undesirable subsidised FDI, as we 
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saw in figure 3(iv).  Let us first focus on the upper part of that range.  One can show that, for ic close 
enough to *)(tc
i
M , setting a tariff slightly below t* would improve welfare.  Lemma 3 implies that 
this slightly lower tariff shifts 
i
Mc to the left so that FDI is no longer an equilibrium in the immediate 
neighbourhood of *)(tc
i
M .  Moreover, for this small change in tariff, the effect on welfare with 
exports is negligible.  This means that the new export equilibrium must be preferred to the old FDI 
equilibrium.  Intuitively, a small change in tariff has avoided the payment of a discrete subsidy.  
More formally, we have from lemma 3 that  0
dt
dc iM and at the same time we know from the 
definition of t* that: 
0*)(  tt
dt
dW x
 
Hence, the benefit of FDI compared to exports, 
)()()( *** tcyttcCScCSSWW xxisN  must be negative at 𝑐𝑀
𝑖 (𝑡∗) so that a 
switch from FDI to exporting must be socially beneficial.  In order to effect this, the tariff is set at the 
highest level for which export just occurs, which we call 𝑡𝑜 , this tariff is lower than our benchmark 
“optimal” tariff t*, i.e. t0 < t*. 
One can also establish that this policy of setting t low enough to avoid subsidised FDI becomes less 
attractive for lower values of ic  -- in other words, for values further to the left of *)(tc
i
M .  This 
conclusion is based on a two-part argument.  On the one hand, for a lower value of ic the decrease 
in t required to prevent FDI is larger so that the corresponding trade regime is less attractive.  On the 
other hand, because competitive bidding dissipates employment benefits, social welfare in the FDI 
equilibrium increases as ic  decreases23. 
Turning now to the lower part of the range, one can show24 that setting a tariff low enough to avoid 
FDI is not desirable: the required tariff would be so low (indeed, negative) that the central 
government prefers to tolerate the undesirable FDI.  Since Wx, Wi and the level of tariff below which 
FDI occurs are all continuous in ci, we can conclude that there is a critical value of ci , defined as isc , 
so that the central government prefers to discourage FDI through a low tariff for is
i cc  but prefers 
not to interfere with FDI for is
i cc  .  We can now summarise these results in a proposition. 
 
                                                          
23
 We have )()()( isiiii cCSScyccCSW  which is decreasing in ic . 
24
 At 0ic the highest tariff avoiding subsidised FDI and instead inducing export is tt 0 such that 
N
CS
tcyttcCS
N
tc xxx
)0(
)0())()((
1
)( 0000   .  At xct 0 the LHS is smaller than 
the RHS.  Since the LHS is decreasing in t, this implies that 
xi cct  )0(0 .  But 
)0()0()0()0()()( CSWycCScWctW ixxxxx  .  Therefore, at 𝑡0exports occur but this 
tariff level is so low that the welfare ends up being lower than that of FDI.   
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Proposition 5:  Define )(0 ict such that )( 0tcc iM
i   and hence the tariff is such that, at current 
production costs of the MNE, export occurs.  For very inefficient FDI, i.e. *)(tcc iM
i  , the central 
government sets t=t* and the home market is served through imports.  For more efficient FDI, i.e. 
*)](,] tccc iM
i
s
i  , the optimal trade policy is to set *0 ttt  , i.e. to lower the tariff to the point 
where the local authorities are no longer willing to offer high enough subsidies to induce undesirable 
FDI.  If FDI is very efficient, i.e. is
i cc  , the optimal trade policy is to set 0tt  so that subsidised FDI 
occurs even though it is neither socially nor locally desirable.   
Proof:  The proof is contained in the text preceding the proposition, and so is not repeated here. 
 
Figure 4(ii) shows the optimal tariff as a function of ci.  Since 𝑐𝑀
𝑖 (𝑡) is an increasing function of t 
)(0 ict , which is the tariff just sufficient to discourage FDI at ic , must also increase as 𝑐𝑖 increases.   
We have  **))((0 ttct iM as the federal government lowers its tariff just enough to discourage 
subsidised FDI.   The corresponding equilibrium patterns of FDI and export are shown in figure 4(iii). 
The host country welfare under the optimal tariff policy, whereby a subsidy is paid to induce FDI for 
very efficient firms, a rising tariff is charged for intermediate efficiency levels, up to the optimal 
tariff, which is charged when FDI is very inefficient.   
5. Comparing Institutional Regimes 
We are now in a position to compare the centralised and decentralised institutional regimes, using 
figures 2 and 4 to compare the equilibrium pattern of FDI, levels of tariffs, and levels of subsidies 
that prevail.   
In the benchmark case of centralisation,  FDI occurs for all iH
i cc  .  With decentralised bidding, FDI 
occurs for all is
i cc  .  Our first task is therefore to rank 
i
Hc and 
i
sc . 
 
Lemma 4:  iH
xi
s ctcc 
* .  In other words, the range of ci for which FDI occurs under the optimal 
trade policy is smaller with competitive bidding than with centralisation. 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
The intuition for this result is that competitive bidding makes FDI socially less desirable because FDI 
induces the payment of positive subsidies.  For inefficient enough FDI, the government can avoid 
such undesirable FDI by setting a low tariff, so that the equilibrium range for which FDI occurs is 
curtailed under decentralisation.   
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Since no subsidies were paid in the centralised setting, competitive bidding clearly leads to higher 
levels of equilibrium subsidies.  The comparison of tariffs is less straightforward.  Indeed, we can see 
from figures 2(iii) and 4(ii) that the two equilibrium tariff schedules are quite different.  For high 
values of ci, it is optimal to set tariff t* under both centralisation and competitive bidding.  For values 
lower than iHc , the centralised solution is to induce FDI by a tariff 
stt  , which involves raising the 
tariffs above t* for an intermediate range.  For values lower than 
i
Mc but greater than 
i
sc , however, 
the optimal tariff under competitive bidding is 0t , which is below t*.  Indeed, we have so tt  for all 
0ic 25  Finally, for is
i cc  the optimal trade policy with competitive bidding is to induce FDI by 
setting 0tt  .  Hence, we can conclude: 
 
Proposition 6:  For is
i cc  the optimal tariff under centralisation always is at least as large as the 
optimal tariff under competitive bidding.  For lower values of ci, we can only say that the lower bound 
of the optimal tariff is strictly greater with centralisation. 
Proof:  The proof is contained in the text preceding the proposition and so is not repeated here.  
 
6.  Decentralised Policy without Bidding26 
 
Not every country falls into the category of full centralisation or fully decentralised bidding among 
regions.  The country might, indeed, contain N independent regions with local authority to set FDI 
incentives while the federal government sets the trade policy; however, all the local authorities do 
not bid for FDI.  Instead, the possibility of attracting the firm to invest is delegated to a single local 
authority.  There are three reasons for considering this case.  First, this is a useful point of reference 
that allows us to separate the effect of the externalities that investment in one state generates for 
the other states from the effect of bidding competition between the states and so allows us to 
further clarify the intuition behind our results.  Secondly, as we discussed in the introduction, it is 
not uncommon for a federal country to “allocate” FDI to a specific region.  Finally, it also provides a 
good approximation for cases where, because of heterogeneity across states, one of the N states is 
significantly more attractive to the MNE than the others.  Indeed, studies of the determinants of FDI 
in a variety of countries suggest that this might not be uncommon, as local infrastructure and labour 
market conditions tend to play a large role in the decision of where to locate27 , including the 
notable historical dominance of Guandong among eastern provinces in China where FDI was 
permitted over a long period.   
                                                          
25
 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥  cannot hold at 𝑡 =  𝑡
𝑠.  Indeed, maxmin SS  at
stt  , whereas they equal at t=t0, implying 
that t
0
<t
s
.    
26
 To increase the paper’s readability and keep it to a reasonable length, all formal derivations have been 
omitted. They can be found in our working paper, Adams et al. (2012). 
27
 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/23/1922648.pdf 
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Let us call the lone bidding state “state 1”.  To define the welfare function of state 1, we assume that 
all employment benefits accrue to its residents.  For state 1 the difference between welfare with FDI 
and welfare with export is given by: 
∆𝑊1 =  𝑐
𝑖𝑦(𝑐𝑖) +  
1
𝑁
[𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑖) − 𝐶𝑆(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡) − 𝑡𝑦(𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡)]                                           (11) 
If we compare this equation to equation (4), which gave us the same welfare difference for the 
country as a whole, we see that since state 1 fully appropriates the employment benefits, these are 
not a source of difference.  On the other hand, we find that two externalities contribute to the 
misalignment of local and federal incentives.  Firstly, whenever FDI leads to a lower or higher price 
for good y than exports (in other words, whenever 𝑐𝑖 is lower or higher than 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡), the 
corresponding benefits or costs to consumers are spread equally across the N states.  Secondly, the 
loss of tariff revenues due to tariff jumping is shared evenly among the N states as well.  In both 
cases, state 1 will then only consider 1/Nth of the effect of FDI on national welfare.  If the price is 
higher under FDI, then, both externalities are negative and there are excessive incentives to attract 
FDI to the region.  If the price under FDI is lower, then the consumer surplus externality is positive 
while the tariff revenue externality is negative; however, we can show28 that under assumption 2 the 
local incentives to attract FDI always are excessive from the point of view of the country as a whole.  
 We can now compare the equilibrium pattern of export and FDI between the fully centralised case 
and the case where a single region is designated as the target for FDI.  The optimal policy is very 
close to that with full centralisation.  Notice that, while it does not have the same incentives as the 
country as a whole, the region’s incentives are nevertheless highly aligned with those of the entire 
country.  First, the alternatives of either attracting FDI or receiving imports are the same for both the 
region and the country as a whole: we no longer have the possibility of another region “stealing” the 
business.  Second, the employment gains are the same for the region and the entire country.  Finally, 
while it receives less weight in the welfare of the region, the form of the consumer surplus and tariff 
loss when there is inefficient production under FDI is the same for the region and the entire country.  
Indeed, it is this loss that drives the bid of the region below the level necessary to attract the firm to 
invest when exporting is relatively more efficient.   
For middle ranges of efficiency, where FDI is preferable to imports for the country as a whole at the 
optimal tariff t*, the optimal policy consists in setting a tariff high enough to ensure that the MNE 
would decide to invest, even in the absence of a subsidy.  Here, even though the locality is willing to 
pay a sufficient subsidy to attract FDI, the central government is able to use its commitment power 
on trade policy avoid this by raising the tariff.  By raising the tariff, the central government avoids 
what is both a regional and country-wide welfare loss of paying the subsidy and achieves the same 
outcome.  For very efficient FDI, the region need not pay any subsidy to attract FDI: the efficiency 
benefit is enough to attract the firm without subsidy.  Furthermore, for the same reason as in the 
centralised case, the central government is unwilling to lower the tariff enough to avoid FDI.  Hence, 
over this range FDI is socially undesirable but is not deterred, as in the centralised case.  For FDI that 
is inefficient relative to exports, FDI will only occur if it is subsidised in some way when the tariff is 
set optimally at t*.  Furthermore, for iH
i cc     FDI is socially undesirable.   
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 See Adams et al (2012) for a full derivation of this result, stated as lemma 2 in that paper.   
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For values close enough to iHc , however, FDI can be locally desirable since the loss associated with 
inefficiency is spread over N states.  The question is, then, whether the local authority is ever willing 
to pay a big enough subsidy to induce FDI when t=t*.  We show29 that this is never the case.  The 
intuition is that given above: while the incentives for the region are not the same as those of the 
central government, they are aligned.  Furthermore, the losses associated with inefficiency affect the 
region as well, driving down the amount it is willing to pay to attract FDI.  Hence, we show that the 
ranges over which FDI or exports are observed, the equilibrium tariff and the equilibrium level of 
subsidy are the same in this setting as in the centralised case.  This reflects the power of the high 
tariff policies to induce subsidy free FDI whenever FDI is socially desirable as well as the 
ineffectiveness of low-tariff policies to avoid socially undesirable FDI. This also shows that the source 
of discrepancies between the policies of centralised and decentralised systems must be found in tax 
competition between local authorities and not in the consumer surplus and tariff revenue 
externalities discussed at the beginning of this section. 
 
7. Tariff Constraints 
We saw that, in the absence of internal tax competition, using high tariffs to induce desirable FDI is a 
very powerful policy option.  Under the GATT and the WTO, however, many tariffs have been bound 
at modest levels.  Whether or not these bound levels leave enough room for the kind of “high tariff” 
policies that emerge from our analysis over some parameter ranges is ultimately an empirical issue:   
when we refer to “high” tariffs in our analysis, we simply mean tariffs that are high enough to make 
a firm choose FDI over exports.  Such “high” tariffs can, therefore, be small in absolute levels and so 
compatible with existing WTO commitments.  Still, it is worth asking how our conclusions would be 
affected if the host government could not set tariffs as high as it otherwise would like.  Therefore, 
we quickly revisit our previous analysis under the assumption that the federal government is limited 
to setting *max ttt  .  For the three institutional settings discussed in sections 3, 4 and 6, we 
briefly discuss how the optimal trade, FDI and the equilibrium subsidies change in a bounded tariff 
setting. 
7.1 Fully Centralised Case and Non-Competitive Bidding 
Let us begin with full centralisation.  Here, the implications of bounding tariffs below t* are quite 
straightforward.  They are the result of two opposing effects.  On the one hand, as the maximum 
allowed tariff is below t*, the export option is now less desirable for the home country.  This effect 
increases the range for which FDI is socially desirable.  On the other hand, for relatively high values 
of ci, some socially desirable FDI must now be induced through costly subsidies rather than through 
high tariffs.  This effect tends to decrease the desirability of FDI. 
More precisely, if maxtcc
xi  , FDI occurs without subsidy.  The only effect of a bounded tariff is 
to reduce the lower range of ci for which FDI is socially undesirable by reducing the desirability of the 
best possible trade regime.  For maxtcc
xi  FDI can now only be induced through a subsidy.  For 
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 See Adams et al (2012) for a full derivation and statement as proposition 4 of that paper and associated 
lemma 3. 
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values of ci close to maxtc
x  , the subsidy required is smaller than the loss of welfare in the trade 
regime due to the lower tariff.  Hence, FDI still occurs but is subsidised.  For larger values of ci, 
however, the subsidy required to induce FDI is substantial enough to make it undesirable.  In 
particular, one can show30 that for ci close enough to iHc , export is now preferred to FDI so that the 
government sets maxtt  and the home market is served from abroad.  Hence, we can conclude that: 
 
Proposition 7: A reduction in the maximum tariff allowed below the level of the optimal tariff t* 
reduces the range of values of ci for which FDI is observed in equilibrium and increases the range over 
which equilibrium FDI is socially desirable compared to export.  For intermediate values of ci, FDI still 
occurs but the tariff reduction leads to the payment of positive subsidies to the MNE. 
Proof:  The proof is omitted here as it is similar to that given for proposition 1.  
 
The main difference between the fully centralised case and the case of decentralisation without 
competitive bidding is that the decision of whether or not to trigger FDI is now in the hands of the 
local authority for the range of ci for which FDI no longer occurs unless subsidies are paid (in other 
words, maxtcc
xi  ).  Here, the incentives to attract FDI are socially excessive; however, one can 
again show that the local authority never wants to pay a subsidy of the size required to attract 
socially undesirable FDI so that the two institutional settings produce identical outcomes with 
bounded tariffs31.  
 
7.2 Decentralisation with Competitive Bidding and Tariff Constraints 
With decentralisation and inter-state competition, tariff constraints have only a limited impact for 
two reasons.  First, the federal government could not use high tariffs to induce subsidy-free FDI in 
any case.  On the contrary, the only “active” trade policy arose for high values of ci, where the 
federal government chose to set its tariff just low enough to avoid FDI.  Secondly, the subsidies 
offered by local authorities only reflect the employment benefits of FDI and are therefore 
independent of the tariff level. 
Still, tariff constraints do affect the equilibrium pattern of FDI, subsidies, and tariffs.  Refer again to 
figure 4.  Since *max tt  and 0
dt
dc iM , the upper range of ci for which local authorities are willing 
to offer a subsidy sufficient to induce FDI shrinks.  However, as long as the maximum tariff is not too 
low, the equilibrium pattern of FDI and exports is unchanged.  This is because, for is
i cc  , the 
central government avoids FDI anyway by setting a low enough tariff.  Hence, as long as maxt is not 
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 Proof available from authors. 
31
 The proof is omitted as the argument is similar to that contained in section 6.  It is available from the 
authors. 
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too low, its only effect is to force lower equilibrium tariffs over the uppermost range of ci.  If, on the 
other hand, maxt were to fall below )(
0 i
sct  then, for values close enough to 
i
sc , the federal 
government would prefer subsidised FDI to importing at such a low tariff.  Hence, drastic trade 
liberalisation will increase the range of values for which subsidised FDI is observed.   
 
Proposition 8:  With decentralisation and competitive local bidding, lowering the maximum tariff 
below t* only affects the range of values of ci for which FDI occurs in equilibrium if the maximum 
tariff is substantially below t*.  At this point a further tightening of the tariff constraint increases the 
range over which equilibrium FDI is observed. 
Proof:  The proof is the argument preceding the proposition and so is not repeated here. 
 
Hence, we have a significant difference in the effect of trade liberalisation in the two cases: for 
centralised or decentralised states without bidding competition, modest liberalisation has an effect 
on tariff and subsidy levels whereas it has no similar effect for the case of decentralisation with 
bidding competition.  Only drastic liberalisation has an effect on the equilibrium tariff in the latter 
case. 
8. Robustness:  Relative Commitment Power, Structured Subsidies,  Multiple Entrants 
 
Our model, while relatively general on some levels, does contain a specific structure to set out our 
points clearly.  Some of our structure makes little difference to our effective results.  For example, 
adding a fixed cost of entry, sunk and paid at the time of FDI, affects the levels but not the shapes of 
our profiles and so does not affect the flavour of our results.  On the other hand, we need to 
consider some other modifications in some detail and will do so here.   In particular, our model 
assumes a particular order of moves, we restrict subsidies to be positive lump sums, and we assume 
that at most  a single MNE may enter the country.  We now discuss these assumptions and the effect 
changing them could have on our results.   
 
We make our assumptions on the order of moves for good reason.  If the MNE does not move last, 
then it makes little sense to discuss the effect of trade and subsidy policy on location decisions.  Even 
if we leave the MNE as the last mover, however, we can potentially consider the effect of changing 
the order of moves of regions and countries.  We have taken the view that trade policy choices were 
harder to reverse than the design of specific subsidy packages.  Still, one might wonder what the 
effect of switching the order of trade and subsidy decisions would be.  Clearly, for a fully centralised 
state this makes no difference.  More surprisingly maybe, reversing the order of policy decisions also 
makes little difference to the flavour of our results for decentralisation with bidding: whatever job-
related benefits that would result given the anticipated trade policy decision of the federal 
government would still be competed away, to the detriment of national welfare, so there is still 
room for a trade policy that sets a low tariff ex post to induce the MNE to disregard the investment 
incentives that they have been offered by the states.   
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Although we mostly used a fairly standard trade model, two of our assumptions deserve further 
comment.  Firstly, we assumed that the local authorities could not use negative subsidies.  While this 
makes a lot of sense when S is interpreted as the cost of public works, it is not as compelling if one 
thinks of S as the discounted sum of tax breaks granted to the MNE.  Fortunately, allowing for 
negative subsidies does not change our results drastically.  It does not affect the case with 
competitive bidding at all since equilibrium subsidies are uniquely determined by the non-negative 
employment benefits derived from FDI.  In the fully centralised case, negative subsidies have more 
of a role, as they enable the government to avoid socially undesirable low-cost FDI.  Finally, with 
decentralisation but no competitive bidding, negative subsidies would be irrelevant since local 
incentives to attract FDI are socially excessive in any case32 .  Secondly, we also assumed that 
subsidies were paid in a lump sum manner, in other words without affecting the local marginal cost 
of the MNE.  One observes a much wider variety of incentive packages in practice, some of which 
might include payments that are related to the level of employment or the level of production of the 
MNE.  Let us therefore assume that, instead of a lump sum S, local or federal authorities used a per 
unit subsidy s. Besides influencing the location decision of the MNE, such a policy tool has the 
additional effect of changing the local and national benefits that would arise if the MNE did indeed 
choose the investment route: a higher rate of subsidy leads both to lower prices – to the benefit of 
local and national consumers – and to higher levels of employment – to the benefit of local workers.  
This changes the analysis in two respects.   
The first issue is that, just as there is an optimal tariff 𝑡∗ that maximises welfare under the 
assumption that the national market is served through exports, there is now an optimal subsidy 𝑠∗ 
that maximises national welfare under the assumption that the MNE invests in the country. This 
clearly changes the ranges of parameters for which FDI is socially or locally desirable.  On the other 
hand, once this basic “rescaling” is accounted for, the qualitative conclusions regarding the 
effectiveness of a “high tariff” or “low tariff” policy are not affected.  The second, more important, 
issue is which of the two additional benefits introduced by a per-unit subsidy are appropriated by 
the authority that sets the subsidy policy and which are not.  In the fully centralised case, the central 
government would fully consider the consumer and employment benefits stemming from a higher s. 
On the other hand, if subsidies are decentralised, then the local authority completely internalises the 
additional employment benefits from higher subsidies but it only factors in one Nth of the additional 
consumer surplus created.  For the case of decentralisation without bidding between regions, then, 
local authorities would have an incentive to set s too low, making FDI less attractive than in the fully 
centralised solution.  The range of parameters for which FDI would occur in equilibrium would 
therefore be smaller than under a fully centralised system. This might also create a range of low 
values of 𝑐𝑖 for which a policy of low tariffs in order to discourage undesirable investment might now 
be desirable. Turning to the case with decentralisation and competitive bidding, notice that, 
assuming that the MNE would otherwise locate in another region, a given region‘s incentives to 
attract the MNE are wholly captured by the employment benefits since any related consumer 
benefits would accrue anyway (and tariff revenues would be lost as well). This means that, even if 
                                                          
32
 Negative subsidies could emerge, in a somewhat perverse way, over the ranges where FDI is discouraged by 
setting a high tariff. Since a lump-sum tax is a more efficient tool than a unit tariff in squeezing surplus out of 
the foreign firm, the optimal policy would to set t=0 and prevent FDI by using S<0.  Even if we allow for such 
policies, the ranges over which FDI occurs in equilibrium are not greatly affected. 
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the per-unit subsidy can be used to optimise the level of employment benefits, those benefits will be 
fully dissipated through interregional bidding, leaving the nature of our analysis fundamentally 
unchanged. 
Finally, it is worth discussing briefly how our analysis might change if we allowed for more than one 
firm in the relevant industry. This issue has two related aspects:  the fact that some firms might 
already be established in the country at the time when the MNE considers how best to serve the 
national market, and the fact that there might be more than one MNE considering entry into the 
national market. The basic intuition for each of these two scenarios can be obtained within a simple 
framework where there are only two regions, A and B, within the country.  All other assumptions are 
as in our basic model. 
 
Let us assume that, at the time the MNE appears on the scene, there is already one firm operating in 
region B.  Let us further assume that this firm is foreign-owned so that its profits are not part of 
either regional or national welfare.  Nothing much is changed in the fully centralised regime except 
that the employment benefit considered is equal to the difference between the level  of 
employment under duopoly and the level of employment under monopoly.  On the other hand, the 
presence of an existing firm raises an additional issue when there is decentralisation but no bidding 
competition: to which of the two states should the newcomer be assigned?  If it is assigned to state 
B, then the additional employment benefits considered by the local authority when granting its 
subsidy would be equal to the difference between total duopoly employment and monopoly 
employment and would therefore be aligned with the objectives of the federal authority.  On the 
other hand, were the MNE to be directed to state A, then state A would consider employment 
benefits equal to half of duopoly employment, which is larger than the difference between total 
duopoly employment and monopoly employment.  Intuitively, state A will not internalise the 
decrease in employment level at the existing firm located in the other state.  State A would 
therefore have an excessive incentive to subsidise compared to a fully centralised authority.  There is 
therefore a rationale for concentrating inward foreign direct investment in the same industry in a 
single region.  Once this is done, the analysis proceeds as before.   In this sense then, our model 
offers an explanation for the regional concentration of industries that is independent of the 
existence of any vertical linkages or network effects.   
 
Let us now turn to decentralisation with competitive bidding where we know that maximum bids are 
equal to the expected local employment benefits. This means that state A is willing to bid up to the 
employment benefits offered by one duopoly producer.  For state B, the maximum bid is equal to 
the total duopoly employment benefits (which B gets if it wins the bidding) minus half of those 
duopoly benefits (which B gets if it loses).  Hence, A and B are willing to bid up exactly to the same 
level, as in our basic model, leaving the rest of the analysis qualitatively unchanged.  Notice also 
that, with competitive bidding, we would not necessarily observe regional concentration of 
industries.  On the other hand, any small idiosyncratic advantage for one of the regions would again 
lead to such concentration. 
 
In the discussion above we assumed that the “existing” firm was foreign-owned. If the firm is 
domestically-owned instead, then the only difference is that the presence of a new foreign firm will 
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reduce the level of domestic profit, which lowers domestic welfare.  Since domestic profits will be 
lowered more when the new entrant has lower costs, the relevant issue is not entry – which will 
occur anyway – but the marginal cost of the foreign firm that is implied by the chosen entry route. In 
other words, the domestic profit-dissipation effect creates an incentive to adopt policies that “raise 
the costs of the foreign firm” compared to the situation where both the existing firm and the entrant 
are foreign. So, referring back to figure 1, the range of parameters for which DFI increases domestic 
welfare would shift to the right. Once this shift is accounted for, the rest of the analysis proceeds as 
before and involves the same effects. Whether the presence of an existing firm actually affects the 
relative incentives to attract DFI under our three institutional regimes depends on the degree of 
localisation of the domestic’s firm’s profits. If these profits are captured only by residents of the 
state where the domestic firm is located and the foreign firm also locates in that state, then the 
incentive to raise the foreign firm’s cost is perfectly internalised under all three settings. If either of 
these two conditions fails then the local authority does not fully internalise this cost-raising 
incentives effect. That further increases the already excessive decentralised incentives to attract DFI 
over the lower range of parameters. 
 
We can alternatively consider a situation where there are no existing firms in the host country but 
where there is a potentially large number, N, of MNEs that are interested in serving the country 
through exports or FDI.  Importantly, we keep all other assumptions of the model unchanged.  In 
particular, the host government sets its trade policy once and for all in a non-discriminatory manner 
at the beginning of the game.  It cannot promise to let a number of MNEs in and then to raise its 
tariff to protect them from import competition.33  Once there is more than one firm that chooses 
between exports and investment a variety of modelling approaches are possible depending, for 
example, on whether those decisions are taken simultaneously or sequentially and on whether the 
host country – including local authorities – have to offer the same deal to all or can instead 
discriminate between foreign firms.  Clearly, considering how all of these approaches might affect 
our results goes well beyond the scope of the present paper and might deserve an investigation of 
its own.  We will therefore limit ourselves to a simple set up that suggests that, under some 
conditions at least, the main insights from the analysis with a single foreign firm do generalise to the 
case of several potential investors. 
 
As above, consider a country with two regions A and B and assume that there are three firms that 
will serve the home market either through FDI or through exports. The number of firm is chosen to 
be large enough so that – in a simple arithmetic sense at least – regions are on the “short side” of 
the market. This enables us to capture situations where the foreign firms are meaningfully 
“competing” for the favours of either the federal state or the regions.  In the first stage, a tariff is 
chosen by the federal government.  In the second stage, the authorities that handle subsidies set a 
single level of subsidy that is available to any firm that decides to settle in the relevant jurisdiction. 
In the fully centralised case, one can then think of the federal government as deciding the number of 
firms that it finds profitable to attract, taking into account the joint trade and subsidy policy that 
would attract this number of firms.  Since the additional job benefits of having one more firm invest 
                                                          
33
 This kind of policy would raise serious credibility issues.  See K. Matsuyama (1990 ) for an analysis of a similar 
credibility problem. 
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into the country decrease with the number of firms investing, there will clearly be ranges of 
parameters for which the federal government finds it desirable to induce only some of the MNEs to 
choose the FDI route. The likelihood of such “mixed” entry route configurations would, of course, be 
further increased if MNEs faced heterogeneous cost conditions.  Suppose then that the optimal 
configuration is one firm serving the home market through FDI and two through exports.  How 
would such a configuration best be induced?  With a single firm, the optimal policy was to set the 
tariff high enough to induce tariff jumping without the need to offer a subsidy.  With our mixed 
configuration, however, such a policy has an extra cost: it increases the cost of production of the two 
firms that will export to the market.  Any trade policy that involves setting a tariff that is higher than 
the relevant “optimal” tariff34 is, therefore, somewhat less attractive than in the one firm case.  As a 
result, even a centralised authority might find it necessary to use some positive subsidy in order to 
induce the amount of FDI that it desires.  
 
This possible change in the optimal mix of instruments chosen under a fully centralised system is the 
main difference stemming from the presence of more than one MNE.  In the case of decentralisation 
without competitive interregional bidding, we have already seen that the optimal policy will involve 
allocating all MNEs to the same region.  Beyond this, the alignment between regional and national 
incentives to invite FDI is not modified.  Finally, with decentralisation and competitive bidding 
between regions, the equilibrium level of subsidy will again fully dissipate the employment benefits 
created by whatever number of firms actually chooses the FDI route.  Suppose, for example, that 
two of the three firms would choose the FDI route in equilibrium.  Assume further that, in case of 
ties between the subsidies offered by the two states, the firms split their locations between the two 
regions. The maximum level of subsidy that a region would be willing to bid is then equal to half of 
the total employment benefits generated by an investing duopoly facing continued competition 
from the third firm that chose the export route. Hence there is again no net national benefit from 
employment creation in equilibrium and the discrepancies between local and federal incentives is 
essentially the same as in our one firm model.  The fact that setting a high tariff has an additional 
welfare cost when some firms still choose the export route is of no relevance to this case since, as 
we have seen, “high tariff” policies are ineffectual anyway. 
 
 
 
9. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have considered a model where a MNE must decide whether to serve a market through FDI or 
through export.  Following on much of the literature directed at users and policy-makers, we assume 
FDI’s main benefit is to increase local employment, which is valued by the local authorities.  The 
MNE’s decision is affected by three factors: the height of the import tariff, the relative cost of 
production under export and FDI, and the level of FDI subsidy offered by the host country.  Three 
distinct institutional arrangements are considered.  In all three cases, policy makers are assumed to 
commit before the MNE chooses its mode of entry.  In the “fully centralised” case, the central 
government sets both the tariff and the FDI subsidy.  In equilibrium, any desirable FDI occurs and is 
induced by setting high tariffs.  If FDI is very efficient, however, it occurs in equilibrium even though 
                                                          
34
 This is the tariff that maximises national welfare for a given mix of FDI and export choices by the MNEs. 
30 
 
it yields lower welfare for the host country than exports.  We then analyse a fully decentralised 
situation where the N local authorities can offer subsidies in order to attract the MNE to their 
confines.  Since there is no differentiation among states in this setting, this case is meant to 
approximate situations where subsidy competition is intense.  The crucial difference is that high 
tariffs can no longer deter the payment of subsidies to the MNE.  In fact, the central government can 
now best fight undesirable FDI by setting a low tariff in order to make the FDI-inducing subsidy too 
high for the local authorities.  Still, socially undesirable subsidised FDI can occur in equilibrium. 
Finally, we consider a setting where trade policy is set at the federal level while FDI subsidies are 
offered by one of N possible states that make up the country or group of countries.  This case is 
meant to approximate situations where subsidy competition between local authorities is weak or 
where delegation to regions specifically rules out competition.  Again, all socially desirable FDI is 
induced through high tariffs but there is now a range for which socially undesirable FDI is induced by 
setting a high tariff in order to avoid the payment of subsidies by the local state authority.   
Since constrained tariff policies might be more realistic in a WTO world, we also analyse the effect of 
tariff constraints on the equilibrium pattern of FDI, subsidies, and tariffs.  If trade and tariff policies 
are centralised or competition between local authorities is weak, a tightening of the maximum tariff 
leads to less FDI but higher FDI-inducing subsidies.  If competition between local authorities is 
intense, lowering the bound on tariffs only has an effect if the liberalisation is drastic.  It does not 
affect the level of subsidies but it increases the range of parameters over which FDI is observed. 
Overall, the message of the paper both concerns FDI and regional competition proper and also 
makes a broader comment about the interaction between trade policy and regional governance.  
First, when FDI comes at the cost of local subsidies, central governments attempt to avoid this cost 
by substituting a high tariff “stick” for local subsidy “carrots”.  If a high tariff “stick” is no longer 
available due to tariff controls, the “carrot” must be used, at a welfare cost to the government.  If a 
decentralised and competitive system is in place for generating local subsidies, controlling subsidy 
costs becomes quite difficult for the central government.  Indeed, these costs can effectively only be 
controlled by making exports a more attractive route for foreign firms.  This is done optimally by 
lowering tariffs, so that only very severe tariff controls can make it unattractive to substitute exports 
for subsidised FDI.  Hence, a decentralised competitive system, while costly, is more robust in its 
operation to tariff controls.  Further, because a non-competitive subsidy system tends to generate 
incentives to raise tariffs whereas a competitive subsidy system tends to generate incentives to 
lower tariffs, the effects of imposing tariff limits on the range of costs over which FDI occurs differ: 
for non-competitive systems, the range tends to decrease whereas for competitive systems the 
range tends to increase.      
Second, our framework illustrates the impact upon trade policy of differing internal governance 
structures.  This is a point raised indirectly by the tax competition literature but, hopefully, brought 
into focus by our work.   Indeed, our model shows that certain governance structures can make 
modest trade liberalisation irrelevant to equilibrium policy while other governance structures can 
make the same modest trade liberalisation quite effective at changing behaviour.  Internal 
governance has not been interacted with trade policy to our knowledge in a full and systematic way 
in the existing literature.  It is a point that bears further investigation. 
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An ancillary result of our analysis in the case of multiple firms is that systems with non-competitive 
subsidy systems can be linked optimally and naturally to systems where inward foreign direct 
investment in the same industry is concentrated in the same region.  In this sense, our model offers 
an explanation for the coupling of regional concentration of industries and non-competitive subsidy 
systems independent of vertical linkages, network effects or any underlying differentiation among 
regions.   
That being said, our emphasis has been on how the tax and tariff system works, not on whether 
decentralisation is desirable or chosen in the first place.  This has been discussed at length 
elsewhere35 and is summed up by Bird (2006), “[whether it is good or bad for welfare,] some degree 
of fiscal competition seems an inevitable fact of life.”  He goes on to say that the question is not so 
much whether, but how such systems work and how they can work well.  Our paper is much in the 
same spirit.  Our argument clearly does not indicate that decentralisation with competition among 
regions is good for either the country or the regions involved.  Indeed, our argument suggests that 
foreign investors do very well by this competition, but that regions and countries receiving the 
investment could do better by coordinating their regional policy or centralising.  Coordinated 
regional policy appears to be quite common, which is certainly consistent with our arguments.  
Indeed, regions could prefer such a system, as the implicit threat of regional subsidies forces the 
central government to adjust its tariff policy to the benefit of the region.   
An interesting, but formidable, task for future research would be to extend this analysis to a two-
country framework.  This would, for example, allow for the analysis of trade and FDI relationships 
between a federalised country (or group of countries) and a more centralised economy.  Extending 
our model to a fully developed case of several MNEs and modelling the local bidding competition as 
a full multi-lateral bargaining process in which trade policy affects the “bargaining power” of the 
parties would also be of some interest. 
  
                                                          
35
 See Bird (2006) for discussion and a case study of Latin America. 
32 
 
 
10.  References 
Adams, L., Regibeau, P., Rockett, K. 2012.  Incentives to Create Jobs: Regional Subsidies, National 
Trade Policy and Foreign Direct Investment.  Economics Discussion Paper 710.  University of Essex. 
April.   
Ahluwalia, M., 2002. Economic Reforms in India since 1991:  Has Gradualism Worked? The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 16(3), summer, 67-88. 
Albornoz, F., Corcos, G., 2007. Regional Integration, Subsidy Competition and the Relocation Choice 
of MNCs. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 7(1), Article 1. 
Bardhan, P., Mookherjee, D., 2006. Decentralisation and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in 
Developing Countries. The Economic Journal 116(508), 101-127. 
Barros, R., Cabral, L., 2000. Competing for Foreign Direct Investment, Review of International 
Economics 8(2), 360-371. 
Besley, T.,  Coate, S., 2003. Central Versus Local Provision of Public Goods:  A Political Economy 
Analysis.  Journal of Public Economics 87(4), 2611-2637. 
Bird, R., 2006. Tax Incentives for Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean:  Do They 
Need to be Harmonized?  Rotman School of Management.  ITP Paper 0601.  January. 
Blanchard, E., 2007. Foreign Direct Investment, Endogenous Tariffs, and Preferential Trade 
Agreements.  The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 7(1), Article 54. 
Blanchard, E., 2010, Reevaluating the Role of Trade Agreements: Do International Equity Holdings 
Make the WTO Obsolete? Journal of International Economics  82, 63-72. 
Blanchard, E., Matschke, X., 2012, US Multinationals and Preferential Market Access. Tuck School of 
Business Working Paper.  
Blomstrom, M., Fors, G., Lipsey, R., 1997. Foreign Direct Investment and Employment:  Home 
Country Evidence in the United States and Sweden.  Economic Journal 107 (November), 1787-1797. 
Brander, J., Spencer, B., 1984.  Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition.  Monopolistic 
Competition and International Trade, H. Kierzkowski, Ed.  Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Brander, J., Spencer, B.,  1987. Foreign Direct Investment with Unemployment and Endogenous 
Taxes and Tariffs.  Journal of International Economics 22, 257-279. 
Bucovetsky, S.,1991.  Asymmetric Tax Competition.  Journal of Urban Economics 30, 167-181. 
Cole, M., Davies, R., 2011. Strategic Tariffs, Tariff Jumping, and Heterogeneous Firms. European 
Economic Review 5594), 480-496. 
33 
 
Davies, R., 2003. The OECD Model Tax Treaty:  Tax Competition and Two-Way Capital Flows.  
International Economic Review 44(2), 725-753. 
Davies, R., 2005. State Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Winnable War? Journal of 
International Economics 67,  498-512. 
Ernst and Young,  2011. Destination UK: Sustaining Success in the New Economy.  Ernst and Young’s 
2011 UK Attractiveness Survey.  available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/2011_UK_Attractiveness_Survey/$FILE/2011_UK_Attra
ctiveness_Survey.pdf.  (accessed February, 2012).  
Estache, A., Wren-Lewis, L., 2009. Toward a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries:  
Following Jean-Jacques Laffont’s Lead.  Journal of Economic Literature 47(3), 729-770. 
Fudenberg, D.,  Tirole, J., 1991. Game Theory MIT Press: Cambridge. 
Gage, J., Miroudot, S., 2005. A Policy Framework for Investment: Trade Policy.  OECD Trade Policy 
Working Paper 19. OECD Trade Directorate.   
Helpman, E., Melitz, M., Yeaple, S., 2004. Export Versus FDI with Heterogeneous Firms. American 
Economic Review 94, 300-316. 
Horst, T., 1971. The Theory of the Multinational Firm: Optimal Behaviour Under Different Tariff and 
Tax Rules.  Journal of Political Economy 79, 1059-1072. 
Horstman, I., Markusen, J., 1987. Strategic Investments and the Development of Multinationals. 
International Economic Review 18, 109-121. 
Janeba, E.,  1998. Tax Competition in Imperfectly Competitive Markets.  Journal of International 
Economics 44, 135-153 
Jones , J., Wren, C., 2008. FDI Location Across British Regions and Inward Investment Policy.  SERC 
Discussion Paper 13, December. 
Kanbur, R., Keen, M., 1993. Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When 
Countries Differ in Size.  American Economic Review 83(4), 877-892. 
Kessing, S., Konrad, K., Kotsogiannis, C., 2007. Foreign Direct Investment and the Dark Side of 
Decentralisation.  Economic Policy 22(49), 57-70. 
Levinsohn, J., 1989. Strategic Trade Policy when Firms can Invest Abroad:  When are Tariffs and 
Quotas Equivalent?  Journal of International Economics 27, 129-146. 
Matsuyama, K., 1990. Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game.  American Economic Review 
80(3), 480 – 492. 
Motta, M., 1992. Multinational Firms and the Tariff Jumping Argument:  A Game Theoretic Analysis 
with Some Unconventional Conclusions.  European Economic Review 36, 1557-1571. 
34 
 
OECD, 2008. Tax Effects on Foreign Direct Investment.  OECD Policy Brief.  Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/61/40152903.pdf , accessed February, 2012. 
Pflüger, M., Südekum, J., 2009. Subsidizing Firm Entry in Open Economies. IZA Discussion Paper 
4384. 
Raff, H., 2004. Preferential Trade Agreements and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment. 
Journal of Public Economics 88(12), 2745-2763.   
Smith, A., 1987. Strategic investment, Multinational Corporations and Trade Policy.  European 
Economic Review 31, 89-96. 
UNCTAD, 2000. Tax Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment.  ASIT Advisory Studies 1.  UNCTAD: 
Geneva. 
Vézina, P., 2010. Race-To-The-Bottom Tariff Cutting. Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies Working Paper 12/2010. 
Wilson, J., 1986. Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition.  Journal of Political Economy 94/5, 
835-856. 
Wilson, J.,  Janeba, E., 2005. Decentralisation and International Tax Competition.  Journal of Public 
Economics 89, 1211-1229. 
  
35 
 
10.  Appendix 
10.1     Proof of Lemma 1 
Notice that only the first and third terms of 
0*)(*)(*)()(  tcytcyctcCScCSW xiixi depend on ic .  By straightforward 
calculation, we have ΔW > 0 at 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡
∗, calculation and assumption 2 imply that ΔW < 0 for 
𝑐𝑖 = 0, and we also have that ΔW < 0  at 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖 .  Assumption 1 that )()( iii cyccCS  is quasi-
concave in ic  guarantees that W intersects the horizontal axis at most twice.  Hence, one of the 
two possible intersections must always exist and must be at [.*,] max
ixi
H ctcc   Moreover, 
assumption 1 guarantees that iHc  is the only intersection to the right of *tc
x  .  The other possible 
intersection, which would define iLc , must lie to the left of *tc
x  and can only occur for a positive 
value of ic , given assumption 2. 
10.2    Statement and Proof of Lemma 2 
Lemma 2: The relative positions of )(),(max
isi cScS and )(min
icS are such that: 
a.  ],0[)()( maxmax
iiiis cccScS    
b.  ],[0max
i
HH
i
LL
i cccS  and ],,[[,0[0 maxmax
ii
HH
i
LL
i ccccS   with iHH
i
H
i
L
i
LL cccc  . 
c.  )(min
icS is increasing in ],0[ max
iii ccc   
d.  ttcS x  0)(min  
e.  There exists one and only one value of 𝑐𝑀
𝑖 ≡ ],[ iH
i
L
i ccc  such that .0)()( maxmin 
i
M
i
M cScS  
Proof:   
a.  Under assumption 2, .0)()()0(  tctytcCSCS xx  Since the expression 
)()()( tctytcCScCS xxi  also is decreasing in ic , we must have 
iss
xxi
cSS
N
tctytcCScCS
S 


)()()(
max . 
b.  Because of assumption 1, maxS intersects the horizontal axis at most twice.  Assumption 2 implies 
that cWS max .  Finally, 0)0(max S and 0)( maxmax 
icS .  Comparing the expression for 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 
to that of ∆𝑊, we see they have the same shape and since 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the larger of the two, it exceeds 
zero for some set of values between 0 and  𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖 .   Indeed, since W  intersects the horizontal axis 
twice, so must maxS .  Moreover, it must be the case that the two points for which 0max S , defined 
as iLLc and 
i
HHc , are such that 
i
HH
i
H
i
L
i
LL cccc 0 .   
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c. )(min
icS is defined as .0)()( min  tcSc x
i   Hence, 0)('min  i
i
c
dc
dS
 . 
d. .0)()()(min  tctctcS
xxx   
e.  From steps (c) and (d), any intersection between minS and maxS , occurring for positive values of S 
must occur for .tcc x
i   Define minmax SSH  and recall that )(
iis cycS  .  We have 
i
s
ii
i dc
dS
ccCS
Ndc
dH
 )(')](')[
1
(  .  Notice that )()( isi cScCS  is the area under the 
demand curve to the left of the monopolist’s output.  With downward sloping marginal revenue, this 
area decreases as ic increases.  This also implies that 0
idc
dH
.  As 0*)(  tcH x  and 
0)( max 
icH , there must exist one and only one value of *tcc xi  such that 0)( icH .  This 
value is defined as iMc . 
10.3  Proof of Proposition 3. 
Given Lemma 2, we can now determine the equilibrium of the bidding game for all values of 𝑐𝑖. 
1. First consider ],0[ *tcc xi  so that 0min S .  This means that FDI occurs regardless of 
the level of subsidy offered by the regions.  Since FDI occurs anyway, the relevant maximum 
subsidy is sS , in other words, the maximum subsidy a state is willing to offer to “steal” the 
firm away from another state.  Hence, the equilibrium subsidy is sSS *  and FDI occurs. 
2. For ],] max
* ixi ctcc   we have 0min S .  Moreover, maxSS
s  .  Since the net effect of 
FDI on tariff revenues and consumer surplus is negative, this implies that regions are willing 
to bid more to “steal” the MNE from another state than to attract it to the country in the 
first place. 
a. For ],,]
i
M
xi ctcc   we have sSSS  maxmin .  Let us now determine what the 
highest equilibrium bid must be.  Clearly, this bid cannot be lower than maxS because 
then it would be optimal for any region to bid up to maxS .  The highest equilibrium 
bid cannot belong to [,[ max
sSS  either:  given such a bid, the MNE will invest in the 
country anyway, hence a region will always be willing to bid up to sS .  Of course, 
bidding beyond sS always is a dominated strategy.  Hence, the only possible highest 
equilibrium bid is sS  .  We must of course check that there actually exists an 
equilibrium characterised by this highest bid.  There are, in fact, many since – given 
that at least one region bids sS -- every other region is indifferent among bids that 
are smaller than or equal to sS .  Despite this, we can still state that the outcome is 
that over this range FDI occurs in equilibrium and a subsidy of sS is paid to the MNE. 
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b. Define iEc as the value of 
ic such that sSS min .  Then, for ],]
i
E
i
M
i ccc  , we have 
sSSS  minmax .  Over this range, two kinds of equilibria can arise.  One type is 
characterised by a highest bid of sS and triggers FDI, while the other type features a 
highest bid below minS so that the home market is served through exports.  In the 
first type of equilibrium, every region bids sS and FDI occurs.  If at least one other 
region bids sS then FDI will occur anyway; hence, region i is willing to bid up to sS in 
an attempt to steal the MNE away from the other region(s).  In the second type of 
equilibrium, every region bids below minS so that FDI does not occur and no subsidy 
is paid in equilibrium.  If every other state bids below minS then region i  is no longer 
willing to bid above it since minmax SS  . 
c. For ),max(, maxmin SSScc
si
E
i  .  Bidding below minS  is a dominant strategy for 
every region.  In this case, FDI is not observed in equilibrium. 
 
10.4  Proof of Lemma 3 
The critical value 
i
Mc is defined implicitly as 
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Let us first show that Num is positive.  First, notice that )()( tcTtcCS xx   must decrease 
as tcx  increases, since both consumer surplus and monopoly profits must decrease as effective 
costs increase and tariff revenue does as well as long as marginal revenue slopes downward.  This 
means that 0)(')('  tc
dt
dT
tcCS xx   and,  since 0)('  tc x , we also have 
0)('))(')
1
(  tc
dt
dT
tcCS
N
xx  so that .0Num  Now we turn to the sign of D.  Clearly, 
0)(' icCS .  Hence, 0)('  iMi
M
s
c
dc
dS
 is a sufficient condition for 0D .  Now, we can use the 
monopolist’s first order conditions to infer the sign of this expression since  
RypcyccyccS iiiiis  )()()()()(  , where R is the total revenue of the MNE.  We can 
now compute 
ii dc
dy
dy
dR
dc
dR
  in order to infer the sign of our sufficient condition.  Clearly, 0
idc
dy
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so that the sign of 
idc
dR
is the opposite of the sign of .
dy
dR
 Hence, 0
idc
dR
if and only if 
0)(')(  yypyp
dy
dR
, which is satisfied since the first order condition of the monopolist profit 
maximisation problem implies that 0)(')(  icyypyp .  Therefore, .0D    
Combining this with our earlier result, this means that − 
𝑁𝑢𝑚
𝐷
 > 0, which establishes the result.  
 
10.5  Proof of Lemma 4 
The critical value sc is the level of costs for which the welfare from exports with 
0tt  is the same as 
the welfare with subsidised foreign direct investment.  In other words, sc is defined implicitly by the 
following expression: 
0)())(()())(( 000  is
i
s
xi
s
i
s
x cCSctcyctctcCS . 
Evaluating this expression at *tcc xis  , we get: 
*)(*))((*)(*))(( 000 tcCStctcytcttctcCS xxxxxx  . 
This expression is certainly positive if **)(0 ttct x  ; however,  this latter inequality must be true 
since we know that, for *tcc xi  , the tariff t* would be jumped even without subsidies because 
the firm could earn the same profit by performing FDI or exporting.  Hence, the expression is positive 
and, therefore, *tcc xis  .  Since we already know that 
i
H
x ctc  * , we must have iH
i
s cc  . 
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